




**Virginia Defense Force  
Staff Operations and Planning Course  
11 Dec 15**



# Goals

- To ensure that every VDF soldier assigned to a staff position understands the following:
  - The National Guard Civil Support (NGCS) playbook
  - VDF missions profile
  - State Active Duty (SAD) cycle
  - Civil Support Events process (CSE)
  - Essential staff duties and processes
  - The military decision making process (MDMP)
  - Warning Order (WARNO) and Operations Order (OPORD)
  - Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) and Letter of Instruction (LOI)
- Can apply these concepts during a tabletop exercise.

# Course Objective

Provides the crosswalk between the FEMA EMI and VDEM G courses and the concepts of military operational and staff planning .

Assists you in understanding and applying the concepts of military planning to what your function in the VDF is.


FEMA/VDEM courses focus on the emergency management cycle and incident management and response.

Conventional military operational planning focuses on combat operations and support/sustainment.

FEMA EMI courses & ICS 100, 200, 700, 800  
VDEM "G" courses, ICS 300, 400



FM 101-5: Staff Organization and Operations; FM 2.0-1: Intelligence; GTA 90-01-020, DSCA Handbook



# Syllabus

- THE NGCS PLAYBOOK
- CIVIL SUPPORT EVENTS
- THE SAD CYCLE
- DEFINING THE VDF COMMAND AND STAFF ROLE
- COMMAND AND STAFF RELATIONSHIPS
- STAFF ORGANIZATION
- CHARACTERISTICS OF A STAFF OFFICER
- STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES AND DUTIES
- THE MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
- STAFF OFFICER DUTIES DURING PREPARATION & EXECUTION OF OPNS
- MILITARY BRIEFINGS
- TASK ORGANIZATION
- PLANS AND ORDERS
- LIAISON

# Historical Perspective

- German Army generally credited with the idea and framework of the modern staff.
- Historical examples of both good and bad staff work and command decisions will be included in this course.
  - McClellan at Antietam
  - Warren at Gettysburg
  - Operation Market-Garden
  - Gulf War I - Desert Storm

# Effective Staff Work

- Brings order out of chaos
- Puts the commander's vision/intent into workable orders that are clear and concise
- Allocates resources against requirements
- Allows proponent agencies to conduct their assigned missions (stay in your lane)

# Clausewitz in One Slide

- For our purposes, three major concepts:
  - Means must be appropriate to ends:
    - Resources must be matched to goals
    - Proper units assigned to proper missions
  - Fog:
    - The uncertainty that is always present
    - Not enough/too much information
  - Friction:
    - Complex or different organizations will inevitably conduct operations in an uncoordinated manner or have different visions of the end result



# **National Guard Civil Support (NGCS) Playbook extract**

2 October 2014

# **NGCS Playbook Index**

Section I	Tier 1 NGCS Capabilities	C-7-4
Section II	NGCS Capabilities	C-7-13
Section III	Internal Support Capabilities	C-7-32
Section IV	Other Resources	C-7-53
Section V	Capability Assignments	C-7-95
Section VI	Readiness Assessments	C-7-100
Section VII	Additional Guidance	C-7-111

# Terminology

- *Strike Team* is a capability, composed of more than one resource, with common communications operating under organic C2 with direct supervision of a Strike Team Leader.
- *Single Resource* is an individual, a piece of equipment and its personnel complement, or a crew or team of individuals, at the lowest functional level, with an identified supervisor.
  - FEMA: A *Task Force* is a combination of mixed resources with common communications operating under the direct supervision of a Task Force Leader.

**Section II**  
**NGCS Capabilities**

≥ 12 hour muster

## ESF-16 AUGMENTATION RESOURCE (ESFAR)

### **CAPABILITY:**

- **Monitor, review and distribute resource requests through WEB EOC**
- **Provide situational awareness of VERT priorities, operations and information requirements**
- **Provide Subject Matter Expertise to VERT leadership regarding military capabilities and resources**
- **Represent the operational interests of DMA ISO of emergency response through liaison with support requestors**
- **Provide executive level feedback to JFHQ-VA Command Group for emergency response operations**

### **TIME STANDARDS:**

- **Muster: OIC report within 4 hours of notification.**
- **Remaining staff report within 12 hours.**

Deploy: 12 hours

### **TYPE STANDARDS:**


**Military: Squad**

**NIMS Type: Single Resource**

### **RESOURCES :**

- 1 x O5 OIC (Air)**
- 1 x O3/4 Operations Officer (Air)**
- 1 x E6/7 Operations NCOIC (Air)**
- 2 x E4/6 WEB EOC Manager (Air/VDF)**
- 1 x W3 to O4 Communications OIC (VDF)**
- 2 x E5 to WO1 TACPAK Operator/Journal (VDF)**
- 1 x TACPAK**

\* Personnel count established to cover 24 hour operations



### **COMMUNICATIONS:**

**P: E-Mail**

**A: Landline**

**C: SAD Cell Phone**

**E: Iridium SAT Phone**

**Total PAX: 8**

## ESF-16 AUGMENTATION RESOURCE (ESFAR)

**COST PER DAY:**

**PERSONNEL: \$2,784**

**EQUIPMENT: \$0**

**TOTAL: \$2,784**

**Section III**  
**Internal Support Capabilities**

Support to DMA Response Forces

# Internal Support Capabilities Index

	<b>CAPABILITY</b>	<b>ACRONYM</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
<b>Aviation</b>	Army Aviation Weather Resource	AAWR	C-7-35
<b>Chemical</b>	(See Tier 1 Capabilities)		
<b>Command &amp; Control (C2)</b>	Brigade C2 Resource	BC2R	C-7-36
	Battalion C2 Resource	BNC2R	C-7-37
	Company C2 Resource	CC2R	C-7-38
	Platoon C2 Resource	PC2R	C-7-39
	Initial Assessment Resource	IAR	C-7-40
	JOC Weather Resource	JWR	C-7-41
	LNO Resource	LNOR	C-7-42
	Staff Augmentation Resource	SAR	C-7-43
	VDF JOC Augmentation Resource	VDFJAR	C-7-44
<b>Communications</b>	Mobile Communication Platform Resource	MCPR	C-7-45
	Incident Management Assistance Resource	IMAR	C-7-46
	State Agencies Radio System (STARS) Resource	STARSR	C-7-47
	HF Radio Resource	HFRR	C-7-48
<b>Engineering</b>			
<b>Logistics</b>	JRSOI Strike Team	JRSOIST	C-7-49
	Intermediate Staging Base Strike Team	ISBST	C-7-50
	LOGPAK Distribution Resource	LDR	C-7-51
	National Guard Logistics Staging Base	NGLSB	C-7-52
<b>Maintenance</b>			

**TE:** Only reportable capabilities are listed. All capabilities included in this playbook may be utilized for Internal DMA Support.

# VDF JOC AUGMENTATION RESOURCE (VDFJAR)

**CAPABILITY:**

- **Command and Control of VDF forces**
- **Coordination of tasking from JEOC to VDF Division G3**
- **Be prepared to provide support to DMA staff as required**
- **STARS, HF Radio, TAC PAK operations**

**TIME STANDARDS:**

Muster: 12 hours  
  
Deploy: 12 hours

**TYPE STANDARDS:**


**Military: Team**  
  
**NIMS Type: Strike Team**

**RESOURCES:**

**1 x O6 OIC**  
**1 x W01-W05 Deputy OIC**  
**6 x Communications Personnel**

**COMMUNICATIONS:**

**P:**  
**A:**  
**C:**  
**E:**



**Total PAX: 8**

**COST PER DAY:**

**PERSONNEL: \$2,902**


**EQUIPMENT: \$0**

**TOTAL: \$2,902**

## VDF JOC AUGMENTATION STRIKE TEAM (VDFJAR)

# VIRGINIA EOC SUPPORT STRIKE TEAM (VEOCST)

<p><b>CAPABILITY:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide LNO in VEOC</li> <li>• Provide Mission Tracking to VDEM</li> <li>• Provide Resource Liaison</li> </ul>	<p><b>TIME STANDARDS:</b></p> <p>Muster: 12 hours</p> <p>Deploy: 14 hours</p>	<p><b>TYPE STANDARDS:</b></p> <p>Military: Team</p> <p>NIMS Type: Single Resource</p>
<p><b>RESOURCES:</b></p> <p>1x O-2 through O-4 (OIC)</p> <p>1 x WO1 through WO4 (Resource Liaison)</p> <p>1 x E-3 through E-7 (Resource Liaison)</p> <p>1 x WO1 through WO4 (Mission Tracking Lead)</p> <p>1 x E-3 through E-7 in Mission Tracking</p>		<p><b>COMMUNICATIONS:</b></p> <p>P: E-Mail</p> <p>A: Landline</p> <p>C: SAD Cell Phone</p> <p>E: HF Radio</p>





<b>Total PAX: 5</b>	COST PER DAY:	PERSONNEL: <b>\$1,878</b>	EQUIPMENT: <b>\$0</b>	TOTAL: <b>\$1,878</b>
---------------------	---------------	---------------------------	-----------------------	-----------------------

# VIRGINIA EOC SUPPORT STRIKE TEAM (VEOCST)

# MOBILE COMMUNICATION PLATFORM RESOURCE (MCPR)

<p><b>CAPABILITY:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Establish communication links required for Force Packages</li> <li>Communication with JTF/JEOC /VEOC for tasking needs and mission status</li> <li>Capable of stand alone operations for 72 hours</li> <li>Provide ground to air communications as required</li> </ul>	<p><b>TIME STANDARDS:</b></p> <p>Muster: 12 hours</p> <p>Deploy: 14 hours</p>	<p><b>TYPE STANDARDS:</b></p> <p><b>Military: Team</b></p> <p><b>NIMS Type: Strike Team</b></p>
<p><b>COMPONENTS:</b></p> <p>1 x WO (OIC)</p> <p>1 X E-6/E-7 (NCOIC, Operator)</p> <p>3 x E-4/E-6 (Operators)</p> <p>2 x E-4/E-6 (Drivers/Security/Operator)</p> <p>1 x 4 X 4 Heavy Duty Vehicle w/radio</p> <p>1 x 25 Ft enclosed self-contained HF/VHF, communications trailer with on-board generator</p> <p>1 x SAD Cell phone</p> <p>1 x TAC PAK</p> <p>1 x STARS Handheld radio</p>		<p><b>COMMUNICATIONS:</b></p> <p>P:</p> <p>A:</p> <p>C:</p> <p>E:</p>



<b>Total PAX: 7</b>	<b>COST PER DAY:</b>	<b>PERSONNEL: \$2,136</b>	<b>EQUIPMENT: \$0</b>	<b>TOTAL: \$2,136</b>
---------------------	----------------------	---------------------------	-----------------------	-----------------------

## MOBILE COMMUNICATION PLATFORM STRIKE TEAM (MCPR)

# INCIDENT MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE RESOURCE (IMAR)

<p><b>CAPABILITY:</b> Provide communications assistance to deployed elements as directed</p>	<p><b>TIME STANDARDS:</b> Muster: 12 hours  Deploy: 14 hours</p>	<p><b>TYPE STANDARDS:</b> Military: Team  NIMS Type: Single Resource</p>
<p><b>COMPONENTS:</b> 1 x O1-03 or WO1-WO4 (OIC) 2 x E3-E6 (Comms) 1 x SAD Cell Phone 1 x TAC PAK 1 x STARS handheld Radio</p>		<p><b>COMMUNICATIONS:</b> P: E-Mail A: SAD Cell Phone C: STARS Radio E:</p>



<b>Total PAX: 3</b>	COST PER DAY:	PERSONNEL: <b>\$934</b>	EQUIPMENT: <b>\$0</b>	TOTAL: <b>\$934</b>
---------------------	---------------	-------------------------	-----------------------	---------------------

# INCIDENT MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE RESOURCE (IMAR)

# STATE AGENCIES RADIO SYSTEM RESOURCE (STARSR)

**CAPABILITY:**

STARSR team to support to DMA console sites , or Base Stations, when requested

**TIME STANDARDS:**

Muster: 12 hours

Deploy: 14 hours

**TYPE STANDARDS:**

**Military: Team**


**NIMS Type: Single Resource**

**COMPONENTS:**

**1 x 01-04 or WO1-WO4 (OIC)**  
**2 x E-3/E-6 (Console operators)**

**COMMUNICATIONS:**

**P: STARSR Radio**  
**A: Landline**  
**C: SAD Cell Phone**  
**E: E-Mail**



**Total PAX: 3**

COST PER DAY:

PERSONNEL: **\$983**

EQUIPMENT: **\$0**

TOTAL: **\$983**

# STATE AGENCIES RADIO SYSTEM STRIKE TEAM (STARSR)

## HF RADIO RESOURCE (HFRR)

**CAPABILITY:**

- **Receive and transmit reports to/from JEOC/JTF**
- **Keep Armory OIC/NCOIC updated on situation**
- **Provide HF radio communications**

**TIME STANDARDS:**

Muster: 12 hours  
  
Deploy: 14 hours

**TYPE STANDARDS:**

**Military: Team**


**NIMS Type: Single Resource**

**COMPONENTS:**

- 1 x O1-03 or WO1-WO4 (OIC)**
- 2 x E-3/E-6 (Communication)**
- 1 x HF Radio System w/ NVAS
- 1 x SAD Cell Phone

**COMMUNICATIONS:**

- P: HF Radio**
- A: Landline**
- C: E-Mail**
- E: SAD Cell Phone**



**Total PAX: 3**

**COST PER DAY:**

**PERSONNEL: \$934**

**EQUIPMENT: \$0**

**TOTAL: \$934**

## HF RADIO RESOURCE (HFRR)

# **Section IV**

## **Other Resources**

# Other Resources Index (cont.)

	<b>CAPABILITY</b>	<b>ACRONYM</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
<b>Logistics (cont.)</b>	Food Service Resource	FSR	C-7-73
	Water Purification Resource - Small	PUR-S	C-7-74
	Water Purification Resource - Large	PUR-L	C-7-75
<b>Maintenance</b>	Recovery Resource	WRECR	C-7-76
	Light Maintenance Resource	LMAINTR	C-7-77
	Heavy Maintenance Resource	HMAINTR	C-7-78
<b>Medical</b>	Medic Resource	MEDR	C-7-79
	Medical Treatment Resource	MEDTR	C-7-80
<b>Security</b>	Security Resource	SECR	C-7-81
	MP Security Resource	MPSR	C-7-82
	Dismounted Security Resource	DSR	C-7-83
	Less Than Lethal Instructor Resource	LTLIR	C-7-84
	VDF Access Control Resource	VDFACR	C-7-85
<b>Transportation</b>	High Mobility Resource	HMR	C-7-86
	Light Transportation Resource	LTR	C-7-87
	Medium Transportation Resource	MTR	C-7-88
	Heavy Transportation Resource	HTR	C-7-89
	Shallow Water Resource	SWR	C-7-90
	Deep Water Resource	DWR	C-7-91
<b>Other</b>	VDF Legal Resource	VDFLR	C-7-92
	Chaplain Resource	CHR	C-7-93
	Tactical Weather Resource	TWR	C-7-94

**NOTE:** The resources listed above are not reportable as assigned capabilities.

# VDF ACCESS CONTROL RESOURCE (VDFACR)

**CAPABILITY:**

Assist with RC and DMA facility access security

**TIME STANDARDS:**

Muster: 12 hours

Deploy: 14 hours

**TYPE STANDARDS:**

Military: Team


NIMS Type: Single Resource

**COMPONENTS:**

- 1 x OIC
- 1 x NCOIC
- 3 x Enlisted

**COMMUNICATIONS:**

- P:
- A:
- C:
- E:



**Total PAX: 5**

**COST PER DAY:**

**PERSONNEL: \$1,665**

**EQUIPMENT: \$0**

**TOTAL: \$1,665**

# VDF ACCESS CONTROL RESOURCE (VDFACR)

# VDF LEGAL RESOURCE (VDFLR)

**CAPABILITY:**

Provide Legal Support to DMA

**TIME STANDARDS:**

Muster: 12 hours (2 hour recall)

Deploy: 14 hours

**TYPE STANDARDS:**

Military: Team


NIMS Type: Single Resource

**COMPONENTS:**

2 x Lawyer/Paralegal

**COMMUNICATIONS:**

P:  
A:  
C:  
E:



**Total PAX: 2**

COST PER DAY:

PERSONNEL: **\$942**

EQUIPMENT: **\$0**

TOTAL: **\$942**

# VDF LEGAL RESOURCE (VDFLR)

# VDF CHAPLAIN RESOURCE (VDCHAP)

**CAPABILITY:**

Provide Chaplain Support to DMA

**TIME STANDARDS:**

Muster: 12 hours (2 hour recall)

Deploy: 14 hours

**TYPE STANDARDS:**

Military: Team


NIMS Type: Single Resource

**COMPONENTS:**

2 x Chaplain/Chaplain assistants

**COMMUNICATIONS:**

P:  
A:  
C:  
E:



**Total PAX: 2**

COST PER DAY:

PERSONNEL: **\$942**

EQUIPMENT: **\$0**

TOTAL: **\$942**

# VDF CHAPLAIN RESOURCE (VDFCHAP)

# **Section V**

## **Capability Assignments**

# NGCS Capabilities

NGCS Capability	Acronym	Required	JFHQ	116 BCT	329 RSG	91 TC	MTC	183 RTI	29 ID	JFHQ Air	192 FW	VDF	TOTAL
ESF-16 Augmentation Resource ***	ESFAR	1								1 (4)		1 (4)	2 (8)
Incident Awareness and Assessment Strike Team	IAAST	2									2 (28)		2 (28)
Virginia EOC Support Strike Team	VEOCST	1										1 (5)	1 (5)
Debris Reduction Resource	DRR	48		28 (112)	8 (32)	11 (44)				1 (4)			48 (192)
Engineer Mobility Strike Team	EMST	2				1 (26)				1 (26)			2 (52)
Disaster Relief Bed-down Set Resource	DRBSR	2								2 (52)			2 (52)
POD Support Resource	PSR	8		2 (46)	6 (138)								8 (184)
State Managed Shelter Strike Team	SMSST	16		7 (336)	1 (17)	1 (15)		3 (57)	2 (137)		2 (98)		16 (660)
I-64 Lane Reversal Strike Team	LRST	1		1 (250)									1 (250)
Dismounted Security Force Strike Team	DSFST	11		10 (280)							1 (28)		11 (308)
MP Strike Team	MPST	6			2 (216)								2 (216)
Security Strike Team	SST	5		5 (180)									5 (180)
High Mobility Strike Team	HMST	14		3 (60)	10 (200)					1 (20)			14 (280)
Light Transportation Strike Team	LTST	5		2 (40)	2 (40)	1 (20)							5 (100)
Multifunctional Strike Team	MFST	15		11 (308)	2 (56)	2 (56)							15 (420)
Cyber Staff Augmentation Resource	CYSAR	2				2 (10)							2 (10)
Cyber Mission Support Resource	CYMSR	3				3 (27)							3 (27)
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>142</b>	<b>0 0</b>	<b>69 (1612)</b>	<b>31 (699)</b>	<b>21 (198)</b>	<b>0 0</b>	<b>3 (57)</b>	<b>2 (137)</b>	<b>6 (106)</b>	<b>5 (154)</b>	<b>2 (9)</b>	<b>13 (29792)</b>

\*\*\* There is only one ESF-16 Augmentation Resource assigned, which consists of personnel provided by both JFHQ Air and VDF.

# Internal Support Capabilities

Internal Support Capability	Acronym	Required	JFHQ	116 BCT	329 RSG	91 TC	MTC	183 RTI	29 ID	JFHQ Air	192 FW	VDF	TOTAL
Army Aviation Weather Resource	AAWR	1								1 (3)			1 (3)
Brigade C2 Resource	BC2R	2		1 (36)	1 (36)								2 (72)
Battalion C2 Resource	BNC2R	8		6 (156)	1 (26)	1 (26)							8 (208)
Company C2 Resource	CC2R	15		9 (99)	3 (33)	3 (33)							15 (165)
Platoon C2 Resource	PC2R	35		25 (100)	5 (20)	5 (20)							35 (140)
Initial Assessment Resource	IAR	43		33 (66)	7 (14)		1 (2)		1 (2)	1 (2)			43 (86)
JOC Weather Resource	JWR	1								1 (3)			1 (3)
LNO Resource	LNOR	6		4 (8)	3 (6)	2 (4)		1 (2)	1 (2)		1 (2)		12 (24)
Staff Augmentation Resource	SAR	4									2 (18)	2 (18)	4 (36)
VDF JOC Augmentation Resource	VDFJAR	1										1 (8)	1 (8)
Mobile Communication Platform Resource	MCPR	4										4 (28)	4 (28)
Incident Management Assistance Resource	IMAR	20										20 (60)	20 (60)
STARS Resource	STARSR	4										4 (12)	4 (12)
HF Radio Resource	HFRR	10										10 (30)	10 (30)
JRSOI Strike Team	JRSOIST	1			1 (185)								1 (185)
Intermediate Staging Base Strike Team	ISBST	1			1 (102)								1 (102)
LOGPAK Distribution Resource	LDR	5			2 (4)	3 (6)							5 (10)
National Guard Logistics Staging Base	NGLSB	2					2 (12)						2 (12)
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>163</b>	<b>0 0</b>	<b>78 (465)</b>	<b>24 (426)</b>	<b>14 (89)</b>	<b>3 (14)</b>	<b>1 (2)</b>	<b>2 (4)</b>	<b>3 (8)</b>	<b>3 (20)</b>	<b>41 (156)</b>	<b>169 (1184)</b>

# Capability Assignment Summary

MSC	Tier 1 Capability		NGCS Capability		Internal Support Capability		Total	
JFHQ	1	(22)	0	0	0	0	1	(22)
116 BCT	1	(409)	69	(1612)	78	(465)	148	(2486)
329 RSG	0	0	31	(699)	24	(426)	55	(1125)
91 TRP CMD	5	(183)	21	(198)	14	(89)	40	(470)
MTC	0	0	0	0	3	(14)	3	(14)
183 RTI	0	0	3	(57)	1	(2)	4	(59)
29 ID	0	0	2	(137)	2	(4)	4	(141)
JFHQ Air	1	(3)	6	(106)	3	(8)	10	(117)
192 FW	2	(53)	5	(154)	3	(20)	10	(227)
VDF	0	0	2	(9)	41	(156)	43	(165)
<b>PAX Count Roll-Up</b>								
<b>Teir 1</b>	<b>(670)</b>	<b>NGCS</b>	<b>(2972)</b>	<b>Internal</b>	<b>(1184)</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>(4826)</b>	


# Civil Support Event (CSE)

- VDF units providing support to local government for parades, festivals, etc.
- All CSEs must be approved in advance (90 days) by the JOC
- CSE participation is a Regt CDR decision and should be evaluated as to whether or not it is a viable training and/or leadership venue balanced against OPTEMPO and stress on our volunteers


# State Active Duty Cycle




# VDF Force Structure



# Regimental HQ



# VDF BOUNDARIES, SECTORS AND LOCATIONS



VDF HQs – Waller Depot, Richmond

## 1<sup>st</sup> Regiment

HHC- Waller Depot, Richmond

A Co-Petersburg

B Co-State Military Reservation, VA Beach

## 2<sup>d</sup> Regiment

HHC-Manassas

A Co-Fairfax

B Co-Fredericksburg (Bowling Green / Warrenton)

## 3<sup>d</sup> Regiment

HHC-Winchester

A Co-Leesburg

B Co-Leesburg

C Co-Charlottesville (Staunton)

## 4<sup>th</sup> Regiment

HHC – Lynchburg

A Co-Lynchburg (Bedford, South Boston, Danville)

B Co-Lynchburg

C Co-Gate City (Cedar Bluff)/Pulaski

# MACOM/ Regimental Headquarters Missions

- MACOM HQs serve as General Support headquarters:
  - Administration, training, situational awareness (information), logistical support, operational planning, deployment and redeployment of subordinate unit teams for SAD.
  - For individual soldiers, the mission is to ensure that they are trained and prepared for SAD if assigned to an IMAR or other resource and/or be prepared to support the deployment and redeployment of soldiers called to SAD.

# Operational Terms

- Military operational terms are important because:
  - Provide specific definitions regarding mission, command structure and support
  - Used to write operations orders and Letters of Instruction (LOIs)
  - If not used carefully, will cause inconsistent guidance and cause confusion

# Attached

FM 101-5-1 defines attached as:

- unit(s) or personnel placement is relatively temporary
- sustainment support (i.e. billeting and meals) IAW the attachment order
- personnel actions (transfer, promotion and unit strength reporting, etc.) normally retained by the parent organization

# Direct Support

FM 101-5-1 defines direct support as:

- support provided by a unit or formation not attached to, nor under command of, the supported unit or formation
- required to give priority to the support required by that unit or formation.

# VDF Direct Support

- For VDF purposes deployed teams are attached to organizations they provide mission support to until relieved and redeployed to home station.
- While attached, they report directly to the person in charge of the organization to which they are attached.
- Upon attachment, the VDF chain of command is now strictly via the JOC to the various teams
- Once teams deploy, the MACOM headquarters is not responsible for, nor should it attempt, to contact IMAR leaders while they are conducting their mission. This potentially violates the concept of unity of command.

# General Support

- General support refers to a unit providing general, rather than specific support to an organization. The term is usually used when referring to the role of combat support units and it is useful to think of the VDF in that manner. If, by analogy, the Virginia Department of Social Services (DSS) is a maneuver unit in that they respond directly to requirements for displaced persons, then the VDF team that is attached to them provides general support .
- In other words, while the VDF as a whole may never be deployed as one functional unit in traditional military operational terms, it will serve in times of emergency or crisis response as a general support unit, providing attached direct support IMARs to agencies such as the Virginia State Police and the DSS.

# Operational Control

FM 101-5-1 generally defines OPCON as:

- Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of major command (MACOM)
- Delegated authority to perform functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission
- Includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command
- Should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations
- Normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions

# Impact on VDF

- It is crucial to draw the distinction between the terms OPCON and attached. IMARs are attached, not OPCON, to the organizations they support.
- For argument's sake, OPCON would imply that a manager could task the VDF IMAR with conducting duties above, beyond or outside of the immediate scope of what the individual soldiers and the collective team have been trained to do.
- On the other hand, OPCON is a command function that authorizes subordinate commanders to train and prepare their teams for missions as assigned in preparation for SAD.

# Missions and Functions

For individual soldiers and teams the purpose and focus is clear.

- Monthly drill training and annual MUTAs ensure individual and team capabilities to respond to SAD requirements.
- Optimally, this means that individual soldiers have completed all required EMI courses and are working towards their MEMS qualification and/or the VDEM emergency management certificates and advanced G level courses.
- For teams, the goal is to be capable of executing all assigned missions through the conduct of rehearsals, mini-COMMEXs, a walk-through, a ROC drill or a similar activity.

# Regt/Co HQs Role During Drills and MUTAs

- Ensure that subordinate units are staffed, trained and equipped to carry out their assigned function. Provide status updates to higher headquarters and respond to requests for information.
- Provide for local recruiting and retention, administration, training, situational awareness (intelligence), logistical support, operational planning and rehearsals.
- Evaluate team proficiency and assist company commanders by providing technical and operational advice as needed or when required.
- \*\*Even if headquarters elements are not placed on SAD, they still retain the command responsibility to assist the deploying unit during its deployment from home station and subsequent redeployment.
- Further, the GS headquarters must begin planning and preparation for providing the following beyond the initial call-up:
  - Prepare to replace individual team members or even entire units depending on circumstance (family emergency, individual health issue, etc.)
  - Prepare to deploy additional teams for unanticipated or additional call ups especially in the event of an extended disaster (Katrina, Snowmagedon).

# Command & Staff Relationships

- Effective staffs help commanders make and implement effective decisions in the face of friction and the fog of war.
- Command: Making decisions and ordering action.
- Control: Monitoring and influencing those actions.

# Command

- Authority and responsibility for using available resources to organize, direct, coordinate and control units to accomplish assigned mission(s).
- Essence of command:
  - Tactical and technical competence.
  - Intuition, judgment, initiative, character.
  - Ability to motivate and inspire subordinates.

# Command

- **Authority-** power of command designated by higher authority
- **Responsibility-** legal and ethical obligations for unit/soldier actions (success or failure)
- **Accountability-** in return for authority, held responsible by higher authority for personnel and resources

# McClellan and Lee at Antietam

- A copy of Lee's OPORD made its way into McClellan's hand; virtually unprecedented in warfare.
- McClellan converged all of his forces at Sharpsburg to attack an outnumbered and nearly encircled force.
- Piecemeal Union attacks against Lee resulted in his ability to meet each attack as it came.
- A coordinated, synchronized Union attack could have defeated Lee in September of 1862.

# Course Of Action (COA)

## Introduction

- General R. E. Lee's possible responses to massing Union Army near Sharpsburg:
  - COA 1: Withdraw immediately over the Potomac River.
  - COA 2: Consolidate the Army's position along the Antietam Creek.
  - COA 3: Continue to march north and consolidate the Army.

# Courses of Action (COAs)

- Each COA presents a mix of risk and benefit:
  - COA 1: Cede the battlefield without a fight and no casualties, giving the impression of defeat: morale vs. intact Army
  - COA 2: Offer battle and hope to inflict significant losses against the Federals while losing fighting strength.
  - COA 3: Risk cutting off line of retreat with friendly units (A P Hill) still at Harper's Ferry subjecting Confederates to defeat in detail

# Control

- Exercised directly (orders) or indirectly (SOPs).
- Staff assists the commander in acquiring information on operations via:
  - METT-TC:
    - Mission
    - Enemy
    - Terrain and Weather
    - Troops available
    - Time available
    - Civil considerations (COB)


<b>MISSION</b> Duration of the operation. Complexity or clarity of the plan. (Is the plan well developed and easily understood?) Proximity and number of maneuvering units.
<b>ENEMY</b> Knowledge of the enemy situation. Enemy capabilities. Availability of time and resources to conduct reconnaissance.
<b>TERRAIN AND WEATHER</b> Visibility conditions, including light, dust, fog, and smoke. Precipitation and its effects on mobility. Extreme temperatures. Additional natural hazards (broken ground, steep inclines, and water obstacles).
<b>TROOPS AND SUPPORT AVAILABLE</b> Equipment status. Morale. Experience units conducting the operation have working together. Soldier and leader proficiency. Soldier and leader rest situation. Degree of acclimatization to environment. Impact of new leaders and crewmembers.
<b>TIME AVAILABLE</b> Time available for planning and rehearsals. Time available to conduct the mission.
<b>CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS</b> Applicable ROE and ROI. Potential stability operations and support operations involving contact with civilians (such as refugee, disaster assistance, or counterterrorism). Potential for media contacts or inquiries.

# How Staffs Control

- Understand and apply the commander's intent.
- Define limits. Stay in your lane.
- Determine requirements.
- Forecasting, resourcing and allocating means.
- Monitoring status (situational awareness)
- Develop specific guidance from general guidance.
- Forecasting change.

# Command and Control (C2)

- Facilities
- Equipment
- Communications
- Procedures
- Personnel



# Command and Control (C2) Effectiveness

- 24/7 mission capable
- Flexible
- Robust
- Redundant



# The Staff's Role

- Situational awareness is the primary function.
  - Understand the threat.
  - Understand your unit's capabilities.
  - Understand the environment
- Each section is the SME for their area.
- Sections must complement each other, maintain focus, coordinate actions to ensure that the end result is mission accomplishment.

# Battlefield Visualization


- For the VDF, this means reliance on the Web, communication platforms, civilian radio and television and Requests for Information (RFIs).
- Status boards, maps, charts and overhead projectors must focus on giving the commander a snapshot of what is occurring in the disaster/crisis area.

# Staff Organization

- Basic functional areas:
  - S1/G1: Personnel
  - S3/G3: Operations/PME
  - S4/G4: Logistics
  - S6/G6: Communications/Signal

# MTOE

- Modified Table of Organization and Equipment provides the organizational structure, personnel and equipment for the unit.
- When conducting reviews and modifications, think about redundancy and 24/7 capabilities.



# Staff Officer Characteristics

- Staff officers contribute to achieving the commander's intent by fulfilling their functional responsibilities within the authority the commander delegates to them.
- Effective staff officers provide commanders with correct and timely relevant information (RI) and well-analyzed recommendations.
- A good staff officer demonstrates the following:
  - Competence
  - Initiative
  - Creativity
  - Flexibility
  - Confidence
  - Loyalty
  - Team player
  - Effective manager
  - Effective communicator
- This list provides a basis for counseling and professional development sessions on what commanders expect of staff officers.



# Competence

- Competent in all aspects of their functional responsibilities and know their duties.
- Familiar enough with the duties of other staff members to accomplish vertical and lateral coordination.
- Expected to analyze each problem and know, not guess at, the correct answer before making a recommendation.
- Must possess the moral courage to admit when they do not know something.

# Initiative

- Staff officers exercise a subordinates' initiative. They anticipate requirements rather than waiting for guidance.
- They anticipate what the commander needs to accomplish the mission and prepare answers to those questions before they are asked. Effective staff officers know the commanders' intent two levels up and operate within their own commanders' intent. They do not hesitate to take advantage of opportunities.
- In the commander's absence, they exercise the authority delegated to them to achieve the commander's intent. When exercising subordinates' initiative, staff officers report their actions to the commander as soon as possible.

# Warning on Initiative

- Don't lean so far forward in the foxhole that you fall out.
- Remember that the VDF is not autonomous; our missions and taskings must come from the JOC.
- Outside agency liaison and coordination must be pre-approved.

# MG Warren at Gettysburg

- Union Army Inspector General.
- Rides to the top of Little Round Top on the morning of the second day.
- Realizes that Longstreet is moving to flank the Union Army; Sickles has compounded the problem by creating a salient at the Peach Orchard.
- On his own, he redirects Union forces to occupy Little Round Top.

# Intro to COA Development (2)

- George Meade at Gettysburg:
  - COA 1: Stand and fight on favorable ground
  - COA 2: Withdraw to previously surveyed ground (Pipe Creek circular)
  - COA 3: Attack Lee
- Robert Lee at Gettysburg:
  - COA 1: Attempt to draw Federals into attacking Seminary Ridge
  - COA 2: Conduct flank march to get between Federals and Washington
  - COA 3: Go on the offensive

# Creativity

- Effective staff officers are creative in researching alternatives to difficult and unfamiliar problems, thus giving commanders new and innovative solutions.
- If they cannot recommend a COA in one direction or area, they find an alternative. As team players, staff officers draw on the creativity of all staff and command members.
- Staff officers brief solutions, not problems. They always give the commander a recommended COA.

# Flexibility

- Staff officers require the maturity and presence of mind to keep from becoming overwhelmed or frustrated by changing requirements and priorities.
- Commanders often change their minds or redirect the command after receiving additional information or a new mission. They may not share with the staff the reason for such a change.
- Staff officers remain flexible and adjust to any changes. They master setting priorities when there are more tasks to accomplish than time allows. They learn to juggle multiple commitments simultaneously.
- Staff officers meet suspenses or request a time or priority adjustment in advance.

# Self Confidence

- Staff officers possess mental discipline, self-confidence and a thick skin. They understand that all staff work serves the commander, even if the commander rejects the resulting recommendation. Working with staff sections horizontally and vertically, effective staff work helps commanders make the best possible decisions.
- Staff officers develop multiple sides of an issue. They do not bias the evaluation criteria in favor of any COA. Staff officers give the commander an unbiased look at a problem and recommend the best possible solution.
- Staff officers understand that a five-minute answer for the commander may require ten hours of staff work.
- In-depth research by staff officers relieves commanders of that task; it allows them to focus on the overall operation. Further, the knowledge staff officers develop for the commander is a form of professional development. It gives them experience upon which to base future decisions as staff officers and commanders.

# Loyalty

- Staff officers are loyal to the commander and the soldiers of the command. This means staff officers tell the commander what they believe, not what the commander wants to hear.
- Staff officers require moral courage. They must be willing to tell the commander both good and bad news.
- Any staff work eventually affects soldiers, who must execute staff officer recommendations approved by the commander. Staff officers never forget that their recommendations affect soldiers.

# Operation Market-Garden

## “A Bridge Too Far”

- Failed for multiple reasons, including inadequate time for staff planning:
  - Too many objectives, too few troops able to land at H Hour on 17 September 1944.
  - Too much reliance on the use of one road, good flying weather for transport and CAS, ensuring that all bridges captured intact.
  - Plan was inflexible and not capable of responding to German initiative.

# Team Player

- Staff officers are team players. They cannot complete staff actions and staff work in a vacuum.
- They must advise, consult, and cooperate with others. They are prepared to represent another's decisions and to sacrifice individual interests when the overall good requires it.
- Staff officers maintain a pleasant disposition. This practice contributes to effective cooperation and coordination.

# Effective Manager

- Good staff officers effectively manage time and resources. Time is always critical, especially for volunteers.
- Staff officers consider not only their own time, but that of other staff members and subordinate units as well. Staff officers recognize that not all projects can be the highest or second highest priority. They set reasonable suspenses that allow completion of lower priority projects.
- Staff officers are good stewards of resources (people, environment, and money) entrusted to their care. They are diligent in efforts to efficiently manage these resources and preserve the environment. They avoid waste, destruction, and duplication of effort.

# Effective Communicator

- Effective communication is crucial for staff officers. They must be able to clearly articulate and effectively present information orally, in writing, and visually (with charts and graphs).
- Staff officers routinely brief individuals and groups. They know and understand briefing techniques that convey complex information in easily understood formats. They can write clear and concise orders and plans, staff studies, staff summaries, and reports.
- Staff officers frequently prepare briefings and written documents for the commander or higher staff officers. They prepare these products as if they are going to sign them or brief them personally.

# Staff Responsibilities and Duties

- Track mission requirements (Section specific)
- Coordinate with units
- Coordinate and share info with other sections
- Track Mission execution
- Conduct briefings as needed
- Train and Mentor jr section members
- Supervise subordinates


# Military Decision Making Process (MDMP)

- Decision making is both science and art:
  - If to decide.
  - When to decide.
  - What to decide.
- Quantitative parts:
  - Logistics, movement, fuel, batteries, etc.
- Qualitative parts:
  - Clausewitz's friction and fog.
  - Rommel's fingerspitzengefuehl


# MDMP (cont)

- Why it works:
  - Analyzes and compares multiple COAs to determine the best fit to accomplish the mission.
  - Produces integration, coordination and synchronization to assist in overcoming fog and friction.
  - Results in an OPLAN and/or OPORD.
- Downside: Takes a lot of time and energy.

# The Process



# Staff Inputs and Outputs



# Mission Analysis Briefing

- Mission and commander's intent of the headquarters two levels up.
- Mission, commander's intent, concept of the operation, and deception plan or objective of the headquarters one level up.
  - Review of commander's initial guidance.
  - Initial IPB products.
  - Specified, implied, and essential tasks.
  - Constraints on the operation.
  - Forces available.
  - Hazards and their risk.
  - Recommended initial CCIR.
  - Recommended time lines.
  - Recommended restated mission.

# Issue the WARNO

- Gives subordinate commanders a heads-up:
- Consists of:
  - Restated mission
  - Commander's intent
  - Unit's AOR
  - CCIR
  - Risk guidance
  - Specific priorities
  - Time plan

# COA Development


- Suitability: Does it accomplish the mission?
- Feasibility: Does the assigned unit have the capacity to complete the mission?
- Acceptability: Does it meet higher headquarters requirements?
- Distinguishable: Each must be different from other COAs.
- Completeness: Must provide or illustrate a complete mission statement.

# Why COAs?

- Prevents (as much as possible) groupthink.
- Encourages “out of the box” thinking.
- Forces imagining alternate outcomes depending on the situation.
- Gives the commander options.
- Allows for flexible thinking as the situation changes and you adopt a different COA.

# Branches and Sequels

- Each COA must have an 'if - then' scenario.
- You must plan for a follow-on operation or desired outcome.



# Wargaming Steps

- Gather tools
- List friendly forces
- List assumptions
- List known critical events
- Determine evaluation criteria
- Select wargame method
- Record and display results

# VDF COA Development

- Mission Analysis
  - Mission
  - Tasks
    - Specified
    - Implied
    - Essential / Critical
  - Capability/Assets
  - METT-TC
- Enemy Course of Action
  - Natural
  - Manmade

# VDF COA Development

- 3 COAs: Sustainment:
  - Plan for rotating out an IMAR after 3/5/7 days.
  - Plan for rotating out individual soldiers due to loss.
- Risk Analysis
- Comparison
- CDR's Approval

# Commander and Staff Roles

- Commander:
  - Formulate and issue mission statement.
  - Ensure staff understands intent and broad concept.
  - Approve OPORD
- Staff:
  - Operationalize the mission statement into order format.
  - Develop COAs for commander's approval.

# Staff Officer Duties During Preparation for and Execution of Operations

- Coordinate (horizontal and vertical)
- Organize
- Conduct MDMP
- Brief various staff sections of briefings

## **Army Mission Essential Tasks**

- Shape the security environment
- Respond promptly to crisis
- Mobilize the Army
- Conduct forcible entry operations
- Dominate land operations
- Provide support to civil authorities

# Military Briefings

- Ops: Shift change brief is the most important:
  - Significant events past 12 hours.
  - Anticipated events next 12 hours.
  - Anything relative to the CCIR.
- BUB: Battle Update Brief
- CUB: Commander's Update Brief
  - Ensure CUB is coherent, concise and rehearsed.

# Briefing Techniques Notes

1. The commander sets the tone for what info he wants and how much time he'll give to each section. Abide by those guidelines. Be clear and concise. No extra points for wordiness.
2. Ask the Commander if he wants a COA overlay or sketch for clarity; then provide that item. If there is very little time, just brief off the current SITEMAP.
3. You can read from print outs of the slides and note cards that subordinates can fill in for you. Or, have multiple people working on multiple slides electronically (keep the format the same). If no computers, use laminated cards you can write on, then brief from.

# Practical Exercise

- Group 1: Prepare a 5-7 minute briefing for the CG on recruiting and retention issues in the VDF. Prepare three COAs and provide a recommendation.
- Group 2: Prepare a 5-7 minute briefing for the CG on the potential challenges of implementing the new Height and Weight policy. Prepare a recommendation on implementing the concept.
- Group 3: Prepare a 5-7 minute briefing for the CG on conducting Forward Guardian in one location (Ft. Pickett) or at local home station armories. Prepare three COAs with plusses and minuses and provide a recommendation.

# Task Organization

- Incident Management Resource (IMARs):

Teams assigned to local/incident EOCs to facilitate communications with the JOC/VaNG.

# Orders and Reports

# Orders: Definitions and Purpose

- Orders and reports are the means by which the leaders and staffs receive and transmit information, from the earliest notification that an operation will occur through the final phases of execution. They are absolutely critical to mission success.
- In a tactical situation, the platoon leader (PL) and platoon sergeant (PSG) work with these vital tools on a daily basis; obviously, they must have precise knowledge of orders formats and reporting procedures. At the same time, they must ensure that every member of the platoon understands how to receive and respond to the various types of orders and how to compile and submit accurate, timely reports.

# NGCS Operations & VDF

- VDF Supports VaNG
- Time is always in short supply
- WARNOs and OPORDS come from JOC
- Typically issued directly
  - JOC generates order
  - VDF receives
  - VDF notifies personnel
  - JOC orders are issued to VDF members

# Warning Order Purpose

- During the planning phase of an operation, commanders and leaders use WARNOs as a shorthand method of alerting their units and individual soldiers.
- The company commander (CO) usually sends a series of WARNOs to his PLs. These orders help subordinates prepare for new missions by providing directions and guidelines for platoon-level planning and preparation. Each PL immediately analyzes the information, then issues a WARNO of his own to alert the platoon to the upcoming operation.

# WARNO Formatting

WARNOs generally follow the five-paragraph OPORD format. The key consideration is that they should be as brief as possible while giving units and soldiers the information they need to begin preparing for the operation. A company-level WARNO normally includes these elements:

- Enemy situation.
- Higher headquarters' mission.
- Commander's intent (if available).
- Earliest time of movement.
- Specific instructions for preliminary actions (including security, reconnaissance, rehearsals, training, maintenance, resupply, rest, movement, and coordination requirements).
- Time and place at which the company OPORD will be issued.

# Unit Level WARNO

- At the tactical unit level, a modified Para 4 WARNO may be used to assist in further planning and mission preparation:
  - Situation
  - Mission
  - General Instructions (Common to all)
  - Specific Instructions (For specific individuals and specialty teams)

# Support Documents/Info

Before issuing a WARNO, the PL should send graphics to the Squad Leaders (SL) either by traditional overlay or using digital systems (if available). The order is almost always given orally and in person, but it may be issued by radio or, on digitally capable systems. As a minimum, the platoon WARNO includes the following information:

- Updated enemy situation.
- Company and platoon mission statement.
- Company commander's intent (if available).
- A tentative timeline to include the following:
  - Earliest time of movement.
  - Specific instructions for preliminary actions (including security, reconnaissance, rehearsals, training, maintenance, resupply, rest, movement, and coordination requirements).
- Time and location at which the platoon OPORD will be issued.

# Strategic Level WARNOs

- Missions from ESF 16 will include information to meet the SALTT criteria.
  - S Size
  - A Amount
  - L Location
  - T Type of Resource
  - Time Frame
- The JOC then refines, researches, recons (Map at a minimum), and analyzes in order to generate a WARNO

# Additional WARNO Info

If other times, events, or details related to the operation are known, they may be included in the WARNO.

This info is included in Para. 4 (Specific Instructions) for a tactical level WARNO.

Info is included in the relevant paragraph of a Strategic or Operational level WARNO

# OPLAN and OPORD

- The Operations Plan (OPLAN) tells “what” will be happening during a given operation.
- The Operations Order (OPORD) tells “how” it will take place.
  - Provides needed information and instructions from regimental level to company/subordinate elements.
  - Outlines what must be done to accomplish a specific mission through coordinated efforts.

# OPORD Format

## 5 Paragraphs

1. Situation
2. Mission
3. Execution
4. Service and Support (Administration and Sustainment) latter for DSCA OPORDs
5. Command and Signal (Command and Control) latter for DSCA OPORDs

# Additional Information

- Task Organization always precedes orders.
- This allows commanders and subordinate to understand the context of the order based on the elements and units involved in its execution.

# Additional Information

- Commander's Intent (two echelons up) always precedes the Execution paragraph.
- This allows commanders and subordinates to understand the context of the order based on the end state vision of the commander.

# 4. Service & Support

- Covers administrative instructions and support provided for the operation.
- Covers supply (ammunition, fuel, oil, lubricant [POL], and rations. Spare parts, services, (hot water), medical evacuation, and handling prisoners.

# 5. Command and Signal

- G6/S6 publishes Signals Operations Instructions defining frequencies to be used.
- Location of commander is established.

# FRAGO

- Fragmentary Orders: Exactly what it sounds like:
  - Partial order that initiates a change to the basic order.
  - Initiated in order to respond to a changing situation.
  - Addresses specific changes, does not alter the overall plan or support.

# Letter of Instruction (LOI)

- Used in place of orders to provide instruction to units for:
  - Unit training assemblies.
  - Civil Support Events.
  - Tabletop exercises.
  - Tactical Exercises Without Troops (TEWTTs).
  - Communications Exercises (COMMEXs).

# Specified/Implied Tasks

- Specified tasks:
  - Directives that must be accomplished as detailed in the instructions.
- Implied tasks:
  - Those tasks that a reasonable staff officer can logically deduce are required to be completed.

# Final Note on Orders

- No set of orders/plans/instructions will ever be complete.
- There will always be 'fog and friction' that prevent or inhibit perfect execution.
- Competent staff work by officers and NCOs with initiative and implementation by trained soldiers can help overcome fog and friction.

# Crisis Management

- Not a lot of time to react:
  - Prioritize your time and determine which tasks must be done immediately.
  - Get available information out as soon as possible.
- Commanders do not like surprises; keep the boss informed.
- Stay within regulatory and legal/moral boundaries when making decisions.

# DESERT STORM

- Succeeded in part because we had 40+ years to plan and train for war against the Warsaw Pact.
- The 'left hook' was flexible and well suited for maneuver warfare in the open desert.
- Ability to speed up the timetable based on Iraqi reaction facilitated success.

# LNO Responsibilities

- JOC
- Maintain current operating picture
- Coordinate with ESF 16 LNO
- Coordinate with J Staff sections
- Typically attached to Battle Capt.
- VEOC – ESF 16
- Maintain current operating picture
- Coordinate with other ESF's
- Coordinate with VDEM staff, Resource Liaison and Mission Tracking
- Assist with CUB and Mission scrub



# VDF Staff Officer Planning Course TRAINING

???

# QUESTIONS???